Most debates about Israel’s offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip center on morality and legality. Is this a case of genocide? Is Israel violating the laws of armed conflict? These are important debates, but they overlook a more immediate question: is Israel accomplishing its stated goals? I would argue the answer is no.
The situation
On October 7th, 2023, Hamas launched a brutal terrorist attack against Israel, killing almost 1,200 civilians—with widespread instances of sexual violence against Israeli women—and taking over 250 Israelis hostage. Israel soon launched a military campaign against the Gaza Strip—ruled by Hamas—including air strikes and ground operations.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was very clear about his goals. In a statement soon after the attack, he he would “turn into rubble” anywhere Hamas is “deployed, hiding and operating.” He also to help the hostages, claiming “Israel will settle accounts with anyone who harms one hair on their heads.”
Since then, Israeli military actions have led to the deaths of over 40,000 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, over 300 members of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have died in this operation, with another 300 dying on October 7th. Israel has also expanded its efforts into Lebanon, launching air strikes and ground operations against Hizballah, the Shia militant group allied with Hamas. And fighting has to the West Bank, with Israel launching strikes against alleged militant targets there. Iran has also gotten involved, launching a barrage of missiles against Israel.
The current debate
Much of the debate rightly focuses on the high casualty numbers in the Gaza Strip and what this means.
Some have fatality numbers coming out of the Gaza Strip as they are reported by a Hamas-run agency, either that the numbers are inflated or include many combatants. Others acknowledge the civilian deaths but they are inevitable in such a conflict, and that Israel has done more to protect civilians than other comparable combatants, including the United States.
But many question the legality and morality of Israeli policies. Some out that while Israel is justified in targeting civilian sites used by Hamas, they are not taking sufficient care to protect civilians at those sites. Others go further and that Israel is committing genocide in the Gaza Strip.
As I said, these are important debates, both for their relevance to this conflict and the precedent they will set for future conflicts. But there is another debate that is equally important and may actually be more effective if one’s goal is to convince Israel to adopt a more restrained approach in Gaza.
The debate that needs to happen
That debate involves the strategic utility of Israel’s actions. That is, is Israel accomplishing the goals it established for itself at the beginning of this conflict?
Israel seems to have accomplished some of its goals, namely the devastation of Hamas. Israel has taken hold of Gaza’s population centers, uprooting Hamas’ deeply embedded fighters. For example, Israel reportedly 80% of the tunnels Hamas created in Rafah, which had made the group resilient to Israeli airstrikes.
And then, of course, there have been Israel’s decapitation strikes. Israel has killed Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader who organized the October 7th attacks. Israel also killed Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah. And Israel has numerous lower-level leaders in both groups.
Meanwhile, Israel has managed to over 100 of the hostages. Most were set free through a negotiated prisoner release, while others were freed in IDF operations.
Looking beyond these numbers, however, Israel’s successes are questionable.
The first issue involves the remaining hostages. Israelis have Netanyahu of not doing enough to free the hostages. And it is useful to point out that most of those freed have come through the sort of negotiation Netanyahu seems hesitant to engage in.
Additionally, the expanding conflict would suggest caution to Israeli policymakers. Israel’s strong response to the Hamas attack did not deter Hizballah from launching rockets into Northern Israel. And Israel’s retaliation against Hizballah has drawn in Iran. While I do not think this will spiral into a full-scale interstate war, Israel is now facing threats on multiple fronts.
Finally, Israel has struggled to truly clear and control the Gaza Strip. Israel’s ground offensive worked its way south to the Gaza-Egyptian border, supposedly clearing out Hamas’ presence in each area it passed through. Yet, the IDF has had to continuously return to previously “cleared areas,” leading one Israeli defense expert to the offensive “endless war.” This has led to Israeli on northern Gaza targets previously seen as safe to civilians. And IDF soldiers continue to be in northern Gaza.
The decapitation strike may decrease the threat, but that is unclear. The death of Sinwar will degrade the operational effectiveness of Hamas. And as some experts have it may also lead to greater openness on both sides to negotiation. But these decapitation strikes on their own tend not to resolve conflicts.
Why this debate can be productive
Whether you support Israel’s actions as regrettable but necessary self-defense or decry them as violating the laws of war, debating their appropriateness according to strategic logic rather than morality can be useful.
There is a limit to the impacts international legal decisions and international opinion will have on Israeli policies. Some of this is due to the fact that Israel sees international forums as biased against Israel, and some of this concern is valid; UN human rights bodies spend a disproportionate amount of time condemning Israel. And some of it is because international law requires powerful states to enforce it, and the United States is unlikely to support any action against Israel.
Yet, Israel and its critics have a shared interest in exploring the effectiveness of its military actions in Gaza. If Israel is not accomplishing its goals, this would encourage Israeli policymakers to shift gears towards a more restrained or diplomatic approach. And even if the political pressures Netanyahu faces limit his interest in changing course, greater attention to the limited strategic impact will heighten public opposition to his policies.
Dr. Peter S. Henne is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of Middle East Studies in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Vermont. He is the author of Religious appeals in Power Politics (Cornell, 2023) and Islamic Politics, Muslim States and Counterterrorism Tensions, (Cambridge, 2017). Henne has also written numerous articles for scholarly and popular publications. He previously worked with the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, the Pew Research Center, and as a consultant on counterterrorism with the US government.
