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Another crisis is potentially brewing in East Asia: According to the Pentagon, North Korea has sent around 10,000 special forces troops to the Russian Far East, apparently in preparation for their deployment to fight in Ukraine. Why the often-overused term “crisis” should be used here becomes clear when we recall the immediate backdrop. This deployment takes place after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in June 2024 for the first time in 24 years, when he signed a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with Kim Jong Un.

What the “Strategic Partnership” Might Involve

The strategic partnership, using the same term that is also used to characterize Russia-China relations, expands on Russia’s security relationship with North Korea in two ways. First, North Korea will be increasing its supplies of artillery shells and short-range missiles it sends to Russia for use against Ukraine. Most analysts see those supplies as being crucial to Russia’s prosecution of the war. Second, the partnership now includes a mutual defense agreement, which mainly promises North Korea protection in the event of “aggression” against the North. What that means in practice is far from clear, however. For example, would Moscow invoke this defense promise if North Korea were to precipitate a crisis with South Korea? That might well lead to a nuclear-level confrontation with the US.

What the US and South Korea worried about after Putin’s visit was two-fold. First, Russia will no longer vote in the UN Security Council to sanction North Korea for its missile and nuclear testing. That represents a major shift in Russia’s longstanding policy on nuclear nonproliferation. Second, Kim Jong Un might become even bolder in his missile tests, to the point where he could make a major miscalculation of US and South Korean reactions.

For South Korea, the Putin-Kim alliance raised another sensitive issue: whether to continue the policy of not sending arms to Ukraine. Until now, South Korea has limited aid to Ukraine to humanitarian assistance and non-lethal military supplies. But Seoul reacted strongly to the new Russian arrangement with the North, saying it represented a national security threat. Putin warned South Korea that it would be a “big mistake” to change its policy. Moscow "will... [make] decisions which are unlikely to please the current leadership of South Korea," strongly implying that Russia would make new arms shipments to the North in retaliation. : "Those who supply these weapons believe that they are not at war with us. I said, including [when I visited] in Pyongyang, that we then reserve the right to supply weapons to other regions of the world." Chances are he and Kim had already made plans for the North Korean troops.

North Korean Troops in Ukraine and South Korean Options

Now, the strategic situation has changed dramatically. North Korea’s troops are already on the ground in Russia, though they have not yet been reported to be headed to Ukraine. Sending military personnel to fight abroad is not unprecedented for North Korea; they served in the Vietnam War and most recently fought on the side of the Assad regime in the Syrian Civil War in 2016. What North Korea may get from Russia in return is technical assistance for its nuclear and missile programs—and the opportunity for battlefield experience.

South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol’s office said the North Korean troops represent a security threat but that the president had not yet decided to send weapons directly to Ukraine. The Republic of Korea and Poland have an arms deal that provides for South Korean tanks and other weapons to be acquired for delivery to Ukraine. That indirect arrangement could become direct, South Korean sources suggest, if the North Koreans engage in frontline fighting. But Poland is reportedly balking at the idea of being a conduit for South Korean arms. South Korea is demanding that Russia send the North Korean troops home, but that is a long shot. Putin may be desperate for soldiers and getting them from North Korea might look like a low-risk alternative to raw Russian recruits.

Kim Jong Un’s dispatch of troops comes at a time when North-South Korea tensions have escalated. The North has cut road and rail links between North and South as part of an official designation of South Korea as an enemy state, essentially writing off the long-term possibility of reunification. Kim may think he has bought Russia’s backing for a bold move against the South.

The China Factor

What does this tightening of the Russia-North Korea military relationship mean for China? are talking about a Moscow-Pyongyang-Beijing axis that would complicate America’s already overloaded security agenda. But “axis” suggests an alliance, which would not be entirely in China’s interest. For one thing, China’s 1951 mutual defense commitment with North Korea lapsed years ago, so Russia is the only official security partner of the North. The Chinese, long aware of Kim Jong Un’s tendency to saber rattling, are not about to put themselves in the position of one day being forced to make decisions about supporting Kim. Second, Beijing would probably strongly oppose Russia’s endorsement of any kind of aggressive move against South Korea, since that would have a major impact on China’s security, not to mention undercut China’s strong economic ties with the South. Third, for China to identify too closely with the Moscow-Pyongyang alignment will only strengthen US-South Korea-Japan security ties for dealing with the “China threat.” And fourth, China, along with Brazil, is touting a peace plan to end the Ukraine war. Since that plan rests on no further expansion of the fighting, Putin’s invitation to Kim undermines China’s effort to be a peacemaker.

In short, China may have the most to lose from this latest Putin-Kim gambit. Beijing does have some leverage with Kim—North Korea’s dependence on China for food and fuel—and with Putin—China’s critical economic and military aid in the Ukraine war. Whether that leverage is sufficient to deter Kim, with Russia’s support, from engaging in highly provocative behavior with the South remains to be seen. Having somewhere between fifty and sixty nuclear weapons can create the illusion of absolute security in Pyongyang. It would not be the first time a North Korean leader has tried to manipulate relations with Moscow and Beijing, with deadly consequences.

The Peace Option

I don’t believe we would be in this situation that resembles a second Cold War if, years ago, the US had done two things. First, the US could have concluded an agreement with North Korea aimed at freezing its nuclear arsenal and subjecting it to international inspection. In return, the US would have provided assurances of the North’s regime and state security. Second, the US could have made engagement with China a top priority, giving Beijing incentives for using its influence with North Korea to prevent this kind of destabilizing alignment with Russia we now see. To be sure, those two actions would have aroused considerable hostility within the US political establishment. But when we consider what has happened in the last few years—the increasingly tense US-China relationship, China’s nuclear weapon buildup, North Korea’s greatly improved nuclear and missile arsenal, and now the likelihood that North Korean soldiers will be fighting in Ukraine—an early emphasis on diplomacy with Beijing and Pyongyang looks like it would have been a good bet. Even now, should Kamala Harris gain the US presidency, the option to change course with both North Korea and China should not be overlooked.[1]

Dr. Mel Gurtov is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Portland State University, Oregon, and Senior Editor of Asian Perspective. His latest book is Engaging China: Rebuilding US-China Relations [Rowman & Littlefield].

[1] On China policy, see my “Partnership or Rivalry? Prospects for a Reset in US-China Relations,” Global Asia, September 2024.